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THE MANN ACT-LIMITED IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT?
Application of the Mann Act seems to be one of the more dif-
ficult tasks in administering justice under federal criminal law. The
Mann Act, or as it is formally titled, the White Slave Traffic Act, has
had a very troubled history of conflicting interpretations by the feder-
al courts. The sweeping interpretation generally given the Act has
been attacked sporadically in dissents since its passage in 191o. The
recent case of United States v. Ross' illustrates the problem of inter-
pretation which has been plaguing the federal courts for almost half
a century.
In the Ross case, defendant transported Nelda Bogart, a prostitute
of the call girl variety, from New York City, where she plied her trade,
to Newark, New Jersey, for the weekend. In Newark, defendant and
Nelda occupied an apartment as Mr. and Mrs. Ross from Saturday
afternoon until Sunday evening when defendant took Nelda back to
New York where she resumed her regular practice of prostitution. The
indictment alleged violations of the Mann Act in that defendant trans-
ported Nelda from Newark to New York for the purpose of prostitu-
tion. Ross was convicted in the district court and appealed. The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Medina, re-
versed the decision below and dismissed the indictment on the grounds
that the weekend trip had to be viewed as a unit and that if the trip
to Newark was lawful, the return trip could not be made unlawful by
arbitrarily splitting the trip into two segments. Judge Medina also
reasoned that there was no evidence that defendant had paid Nelda
for her services on the weekend and, "even if appellant had paid Nelda
it would make no difference, as the charge is not that he took her to
Newark for immoral purposes, but rather that he transported her
from Newark to New York 'for the purpose of prostitution.' "2
The report of the case states that "indictment alleged violations
of the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. section 2421.- 3 This section states: "Who-
ever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce... any
woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for
any other immoral purpose... Shall be fined not more than $500o or
1257 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1958).
!Id. at 293. It seems unnecessary to discuss the mercenary motive in that the
point is well-settled that no pecuniary gain on the part of the woman is necessary
for a conviction under the Mann Act. Brown v. United States, 237 F.2d 281 (8th
Cir. 1956).
3257 F.2d at 292.
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imprisoned not more than five years, or both."4 It appears to be a
fair assumption that an allegation of violation of this section would
implictly include an allegation against defendant that he transported
Nelda either for the purpose of "prostitution or debauchery, or for any
other immoral purpose." The occupation by the defendant and Nelda
of the Newark apartment "as Mr. and Mrs. Ross" 5 indicates immoral
conduct, if not debauchery, on the part of Nelda at the point of desti-
nation.6 Following this reasoning, it appears that Judge Medina could
have sustained the conviction of the trial court on the theory that the
purpose of the whole trip was unlawful; that is, the first leg of the trip
was for the purpose of debauchery, and the second leg of the trip was
for the purpose of prostitution.7
Also, the point brought out by Judge Medina that the indictment
charged the defendant took Nelda from Newark to New York and
not that he took her from New York to Newark is, it is submitted, of
no consequence because the indictment need only show that the com-
mission of the offense took place within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court.8 Moreover, since a violation of the Mann Act takes place
when the state line is crossed,9 the violation would be the same irres-
"White Slave Traffic Act (Mann Act) § 2, 36 Stat. 825 (1910), 18 U.S.C. 2421
(1952).
257 F.2d at 292. In a 192o case the court emphasized that registering at a
hotel as man and wife was material in sustaining a conviction under the Mann
Act. Carey v. United States, 265 Fed. 515 (8th Cir. 1920).
"The courts have drawn no distinction between commercial prostitution and
debauchery when considering the purpose of the interstate transportation in de-
termining if a violation of the Mann Act has occurred. This is illustrated by the
language in Brown v. United States, 237 F.2d 281, 283 (8th Cir. 1956), in which
the court said, "The language of Section 2421, Title i8 U.S.C., in our opinion,
covers the interstate transportation, without pecuniary motive, of a woman with
intent to have illicit relations with her by force or otherwise. As the Supreme Court
said in the Caminetti case, ... 'To say the contrary would shock the common
understanding of what constitutes an immoral purpose when those terms are
applied, as here, to sexual relations.' " (Citations omitted.) The following cases
have sustained convictions for interstate transportation of women for devious
purposes other than prostitution: Long v. United States, 16o F.2d 706 (loth Cir.
1947) (immoral practices); United States v. Lewis, 110 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1940)
(girls appearing in carnival sideshow). See also Hunter v. United States, 45 F.2d
55 (.tth Cir. 1930) (purpose of transportation need only be for sexual ,intercourse).
7it may be that a valid ground for reversal of the conviction is that the Govern-
ment's evidence failed to support the precise offense changed, i.e., interstate trans-
portation for the purpose of prostitution. However, Judge Medina's opinion
seems to put the reversal on a broader ground as laid down by the United States
Supreme Court in Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944) (splitting the
trip).
'Butler v. United States, 197 F.2d 561 (loth Cir. 1952).
OBatsell v. United States, 217 F.2d 257 (8th Cir. 1954); Ellis v. United States,
138 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1943); Neff v. United States, lo5 F.2d 688 (8th Cir. 1939).
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pective of the direction of travel in that the defendant would cross
the same state line whether he were going from New York to New Jer-
sey, or vice versa.
In reaching his decision Medina relied heavily upon Mortensen
v. United States,'0 in which the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed the conviction of the lower court. In Mortensen, the defen-
dants, a man and his wife, were the proprietors of a house of prosti-
tution. Two of their girl employees accompanied them on an inter-
state vacation. During this time the girls committed no immoral act,
the trip being solely for recreational purposes. Upon their return, the
girls resumed their practice of prostitution in defendant's employ.
The lower court convicted the defendants on the theory that the re-
turn trip to the place of origin violated the Mann Act. In reversing
the lower court's conviction, the United States Supreme Court stated:
"Whatever their faults, petitioners are entitled to have just and fair
treatment under the law and not to be punished for transporting girls
in interstate commerce for a purpose wholly different from any of the
purposes condemned by Congress."" The court reasoned that the
purpose of the whole trip-a vacation-was not the type that Congress
intended to condemn, and that the trip should be viewed as a unit and
not arbitrarily split in order to impute a criminal purpose to the re-
turn trip when a lawful purpose existed upon the embarkation.
Judge Medina in rendering his decision states that "the Supreme
Court in an unbroken line of decisions on the precise point has held
that the trip to and fro must be taken as a unit. It cannot be split up
into two trips."' 2 while this statement is correct as such, there is a
factual distinction between the principal case and the "unbroken line
of decisions" relied upon by Judge Medina. In the case cited in Ross
as supporting this statement there was no evidence of any immoral
conduct on the part of the parties transported during the course of the
trip. However, in the principal case defendant and Nelda presumably
engaged in immoral conduct. Therefore, the decision of the Supreme
Court relied upon as being binding authority in the principal case
was distinguishable on the precise point which confronted the court
in the Ross case. Furthermore, in view of the fact that the original pur-
1322 U.S. 369 (1!44). The court also cited Oriolo v. United States, 324 U.S. 824,
reversing 146 F.2d 52 (3d Cir. 1944) , as supporting its decision. Oriolo is similar
to Mortensen in that the trip taken by defendant was merely a day's outing to
Atlantic City, New Jersey, during the course of which no immoral acts were com-
mitted by defendant or his companion.
-a322 U.S. at 376.
1257 F.2d at 293. (Emphasis added.)
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pose of the trip was immoral, the necessity of splitting the trip in order
to find an unlawful purpose no longer exists. It is submitted that the
conviction could be upheld notwithstanding the necessity of viewing
the trip as a unit, in that the purpose of the whole trip was immoral.
Judge Medina in this case has given a limited application to the
Mann Act, thereby placing this case in the rare minority which have
applied the Mann Act in accord with the intent of Congress as evi-
denced in part by the formal title of the Act, i.e., the White Slave
Traffic Act. Further indication of the congressional intent to thwart
wide-scale commercialized prostitution can be seen in the House and
Senate Reports: "The legislation is needed to put a stop to a villain-
ous interstate and international traffic in women and girls.... It does
not attempt to regulate the practice of voluntary prostitution, but aims
solely to prevent panderers and procurers from compelling thousands
of women and girls against their will and desire to enter and continue
in a life of prostitution."'13
The federal courts have by interpretation converted the Mann
Act into a statute governing the conduct of individuals engaged in
infrequent, non-commercial immoralities-the exact converse of the
purpose of the Act as intended by its framers. With the decision in
Athanasaw v. United States' 4 in 1912, the door was opened for courts
to turn the Mann Act into "merely a means of trapping a few non-
commercial minnows, while the sharks of commercialized vice carry on
their predatory work with impunity and immunity."'3 In Athanasaw,
a theatre operator was convicted under the Mann Act for supplying
train tickets to a girl in order that she could come to Florida to dance
in the chorus at defendant's theatre. In affirming the conviction the
court said that "the employment to which she was enticed was an
efficient school of debauchery of the special immorality which ... the
statute was designed to cover."' 6 Though defendant asked the person
transported to "become his girl,"' 7 the only other evidence of prosti-
tution, debauchery, or any other immoral purpose in this case was
'H.R. Rep. No. 47, 6ist Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (09o); S. Rep. No 886, 61st ong.,
2d Sess. 14 (1910).
1'227 U.S. 326 (1913). A later case held that the transportation of the girls to
dance in a house of ill-repute was sufficient to affirm a conviction under the Mann
Act on the grounds that defendants "subjected them [the girls] to all the evil
influences of such surroundings." The court said even though defendants expressly
instructed the girls not to engage in the practice of prostitution the conduct of de-
fendants was still of the type which the statute prohibited. Beyer v. United States,
251 Fed. 39, 41 (9th Cir. 1920).
1United States v. Jamerson, 6o F. Supp. 281, 284 (N.D. Iowa 1944).
1227 U.S. at 333.
171d. at 329.
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the cursing, drinking, and smoking of the other members of the cast.
Such a sweeping interpretation of the language of the Act in the A than-
asaw case led to conviction for a single instance of immorality on the
part of one man and one woman in Caminetti v. United States.'8 The
able dissent of Mr. Justice McKenna in Caminetti states a valid criti-
criticism of the broad judicial interpretation of the statute by point-
ing out that the court "should not shut its eyes to the facts of the
world and assume not to know what everybody else knows. And every-
body knows that there is a difference between the occasional immor-
alities of men and women and that systematized and mercenary im-
morality epitomized in the statutes graphic phrase 'White-slave traffic'.
And it was such immorality that was in the legislative mind and not
the other.... Interstate commerce is not its instrument as it is of the
other, nor is prostitution its object or its end."'19
The scope of the Mann Act was considerably broadened in 1924
by bringing into its coverage an interstate transportation of a girl
for the purpose of an invalid marriage.2 ° However, the peak of the
crescendo of repeated interpretation contrary to legislative intent was
reached in Cleveland v. United States21 in which members of a re-
ligious sect were convicted for transporting their plural wives across
a state line. The continued erroneous interpretation of the Mann
Act by the judiciary is clearly brought out by Mr. Justice Murphy,
dissenting in Cleveland:
"The result here reached is but another consequence of this
court's long-continued failure to recognize that the White Slave
Traffic Act, as its title indicates, is aimed solely at the diaboli-
1B242 U.S. 470 (1917).
"Id. at 502.
'OBurgess v. United States, 294 Fed. 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1924). Also in 1924 a de-
fendant was convicted under the Mann Act for merely supplying railroad tickets to
a woman in order that she could return from Boise, Idaho, to Spokane, Washington,
to resume an illicit cohabitation with defendant. Corbett v. United States, 299 Fed.
27 (9th Cir. 1924).
23 2 9 U.S. 14 (1946). This case seems to have reached a result more repugnant
to legislative intent than any other decided in the past. The courts themselves
speak of a requisite intent on the part of defendant to engage in immoral prac-
tices or a requisite immoral intent as a purpose in making the interstate trip. Dunn
v. United States, 19o F.-d 496 (0oth Cir. 1951); Langford v. United States, 178 F.2d
48 (9 th Cir. 1949); United States v. Lewis, 11o F.2d 460 (7 th Cir. 1940). If the trans-
portation was not solely for an immoral purpose, such purpose must constitute one
of the reasons for the transportation. Daigle v. United States, 181 F.2d 311 (1st Cir.
195o); Long v. United States, 16o F.2d 706 (loth Cir. 1947). However, in the Cleve-
land case immoral conduct on the part of the women transported was neither ac-
complished nor facilitated by the interstate transportation. In fact, the conduct in
question was not even immoral viewed in the light of defendant's religion.
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